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Disclosure or not, When There are Three Bidders?
Daniel Z. LI
Abstract
This paper provides a more general su¢ cient condition than Hummel and McAfee (2015)
for optimal information disclosure in auctions when there are three bidders. We show
that the optimal disclosure policy is related to the skewness of the distribution of bidders
valuations. Specically, if the distribution is skewed to the left (right), it is optimal for the
seller to reveal full (no) information to the bidders. And if it is symmetric, then theres no
di¤erence between revealing information or not.
JEL Classication: D44, D83, M37
1 Introduction
Information disclosure and advertising are pervasive in the real world, and a natural question of
interest is to investigate optimal disclosure policy in the presence of preference di¤erentiation.
When consumers preferences are di¤erentiated, revealing product information will drive up
the valuations of some consumers, yet at the same time drive down those of others. In the
context of monopoly pricing, Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) state
that, the optimal disclosure policy is extreme, in the sense that it is optimal for a seller to
reveal either full or no information of the product to the consumers. The intuition behind
is that, in the presence of preference di¤erentiation, information disclosure will induce more
dispersed distribution of consumersposterior valuations, and thus the clockwise rotation of the
demand curve. As a result, the seller faces the trade-o¤ between a mass marketing strategy, by
revealing less information, charging a low price and serving all consumers, and a niche marketing
strategy, by revealing more information, charging a high price yet just serving a portion of the
consumers. They show that, when information is costless, the expected prot is quasi-convex
in the informativeness of advertising, and therefore the optimal disclosure policy is extreme.
Similar results are also reported in the context of auctions (Ganuza, 2004; Board, 2009;
Ganuza and Panelva, 2010; Hummel and McAfee, 2015). In auctions, it is found that the
sellers incentive to reveal product information increases in the number of bidders, denoted by
n. Specically, when there are just 2 bidders, it is optimal for the seller not to reveal information
(Board, 2009; Hummel and McAfee, 2015). And there exists a cuto¤ number of N0, such that
when n  N0, it is optimal for the seller to reveal full product information to the bidders, if
information is costless. The intuition is that, revealing information induces more dispersed
distribution of biddersvaluations, which will increase both the winning bidders valuation and
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his information rent, and the joint e¤ect on auction revenue is then mixed. On the other hand,
increasing competition commonly squeezes out the information rent of the winning bidder, and
therefore, when the number of bidders increases, the seller will have more incentive to reveal
product information.
Though Board (2009) and Ganuza and Panelva (2010) show the existence of a cuto¤ number
N0, they do not characterize it and specify what will happen when the number of bidders is
inbetween, that is, when 2 < n < N0. Hummel and McAfee (2015) provide a nice result that,
when biddersvaluation distribution satises increasing failure rate (IFR), the cuto¤ number
N0 = 4. They further provide a su¢ cient condition for optimal information disclosure when
n = 3, but that condition imposes strict monotonicity requirement on the probability density
function, which is clearly quite restrictive. In this paper, we provide a more general su¢ cient
condition for that, and show that when n = 3, the optimal disclosure policy is related to the
skewness of the distribution of biddersvaluations. Our results help to ll the last gap in the
long exploration of this question.
2 The Model and Main Results
An auctioneer sells a product to n  2 risk-neutral bidders, indexed by i 2 f1; 2;    ; ng, using
a standard auction. The bidders do not know their valuations in advance, which depend on
the realizations of a random variable X 2 [0; V ], where V can be innity. The cumulative
distribution function of X is F (x), with a probability density function of f (x) and nite mean
E [X].
If theres no information disclosure, all the bidders will share the same expected valuation of
E [X]. Assume revealing information is costless. If the seller reveals product information prior
to the auction, then the biddersvaluations, Xis, are n independent draws from the distribution
F , and the corresponding order statistics are
X1:n  X2:n      Xn:n
We denote the cumulative distribution function of Xi:n by Fi:n (x).
In a standard auction without reserve price, the bidder o¤ering the highest bid wins and the
expected payment is equal to the expected value of the second highest valuation. Therefore,
the expected auction revenue is E [X2:n], under information disclosure. On the other hand, if
theres no information disclosure, the expected auction revenue is clearly E [X]. We denote the
di¤erence between the expected revenues by
n = E [X2:n]  E [X] (1)
Then the question is, under what condition, revealing information generates higher expected
revenues for the seller?
Board (2009) and Hummel and McAfee (2015) both show that when n = 2, it is optimal for
the seller to withhold product information. The idea is that, when n = 2, X2:2 = min fX1; X2g
is a concave function, and by Jensens inequality, we have E [X2:2] = E [min fX1; X2g] 
min fE [X1] ; E [X2]g = E [X]. And therefore 2  0 and withholding information is opti-
mal for the seller. It is worthy of attention that, when bidders valuations are draws from
di¤erent distributions, this result for n = 2 still holds.
As mentioned above, Board (2009), Ganuza and Panelva (2010) and Hummel and McAfee
(2015) all show that, there exists a cuto¤ number N0, and when n  N0, it is optimal for the
seller to reveal full product information. Under the IFR assumption, Hummel and McAfee
(2015) further show that N0 = 4, and provide a su¢ cient condition for optimal information
disclosure when there are 3 bidders. That su¢ cient condition is rather restrictive, and we quote
their result as below.
Proposition 1 (Hummel & McAfee, 2015) For n = 3, i) if f (x) is increasing in x through-
out its support, then 3 > 0; ii) if f (x) is decreasing in x throughout its support, then 3 < 0;
iii) if f (x) is constant in x throughout its support, then 3 = 0.
This su¢ cient condition imposes strict monotonicity requirements on f (x), which is quite
restrictive for density functions. In this article, we provide a more general su¢ cient condition
than that, and show that when n = 3, the optimal disclosure policy is related to the skewness
of the distribution F . With our model setup, we have
n = E [X2:n]  E [X] =
Z V
0
[F (x)  F2:n (x)] dx
where the cumulative distribution function F2:n (x) = Fn (x) + n (1  F (x))Fn 1 (x). When
n = 3, it follows that
3 =
Z V
0
F (x) (1  F (x)) [1  2F (x)] dx (2)
It is interesting to observe that X2:3 is the sample median of the order statistics. So the
comparison between E [X2:3] and E [X] is just the comparison between the expectation of sample
median and the mean of the distribution F . If F is symmetric, then by intuition they should
be equal and thus 3 = 0. We then provide the rst result as below.
Lemma 2 If F (x) is symmetric, then 3 = 0.
Proof. By denition, if F (x) is symmetric, then F (x) = 1  F (V   x). From (2),
3 =
Z V
2
0
F (x) (1  F (x)) [1  2F (x)] dx+
Z V
V
2
F (x) (1  F (x)) [1  2F (x)] dx
where the second integral
=
Z V
V
2
[1  F (V   x)]F (V   x) [1  2 [1  F (V   x)]] dx
=  
Z V
2
0
F (y) [1  F (y)] [1  2F (y)] dy
And therefore 3 = 0.
The symmetric condition for F (x) is obviously weaker than the condition of constant f (x)
in Hummel and McAfee (2015). We take this idea onwards and show that the value of 3
depends on the asymmetry or skewness of the distribution F . For instance, for a unimodal
distribution F , if it is skewed to the right, then 3 < 0; and if it is skewed to the left, then
3 > 0. We rst introduce the following function
 (v) = f

F 1 (0:5 + v)
  f F 1 (0:5  v) for v 2 (0; 0:5) (3)
Specically, if  (v) < 0, we would say that F is right-skewed. The idea is that, for any two
values x1 = F 1 (0:5  v) and x2 = F 1 (0:5 + v) such that both have equal tail probabilities,
we have x1 < x2 and the density f (x1) > f (x2), which implies that the distribution is skewed
to the right. We next provide the main result of this paper.
Proposition 3 For n = 3, if for all v 2  0; 12
(i)  (v) > 0 , then 3 > 0 and revealing information is better;
(ii)  (v) < 0, then 3 < 0 and withholding information is better.
(iii)  (v) = 0, then 3 = 0 and theres no di¤erence between revealing or not.
Proof. From (2), let u = F (x) 2 [0; 1], and we have
3 =
Z 1
0
u (1  u) [1  2u] dF 1 (u) =
Z 1
0
1
f [F 1 (u)]
u (1  u) (1  2u) du
= 2
Z 1
2
0
1
f

F 1
 
1
2   v
 1
2
  v

1
2
+ v

vdv
 2
Z 1
2
0
1
f

F 1
 
1
2 + v
 1
2
+ v

1
2
  v

vdv
= 2
Z 1
2
0
(
1
f

F 1
 
1
2   v
   1
f

F 1
 
1
2 + v
)1
2
  v

1
2
+ v

vdv
If  (v) > 0 for all v 2  0; 12, then the integrand is positive and thus 3 > 0.
The su¢ cient condition on  (v) is apparently weaker than the monotonic density condition
proposed in Hummel and McAfee (2015), as f 0 (x) > 0 implies  (v) > 0, yet not vise versa.
It is obvious that  (v) is introduced naturally in our proof of Proposition 3, yet an equivalent
version of it is also introduced in Van Zwet (1979). Di¤erent from Van Zwets study of a single
distribution, here we focus on the comparison between the expectation of the sample median
of order statistics and the mean of F . Furthermore, as shown in the following example, the
median of F is not necessarily equal to the expectation of the sample median.
We next introduce a simple example of asymmetric triangular distribution, where the density
function f (x) is not monotonic, it rst increasing until the mode and then decreasing afterward.
The example helps to illustrate the main result of this paper.
Example 4 Consider an example of asymmetric triangular distribution on x 2 [0; 1], with mode
1
3 . The probability density and cumulative distribution function are respectively
f (x) =
(
6x if x 2 0; 13
3 (1  x) if x 2  13 ; 1 F (x) =
(
3x2 if x 2 0; 13
1  32 (1  x)2 if x 2
 
1
3 ; 1

It is clear that the distribution of X is skewed to the right, and its median, 1 p1=3, is smaller
than its mean of E [X] = 49 . The quantile function of X is
F 1 (u) =
8<:
q
1
3u if u 2

0; 13

1 
q
2
3 (1  u) if u 2
 
1
3 ; 1

We rst show that  (v) < 0 for all v 2  0; 12, as follows
 (v) = f

F 1 (0:5 + v)
  f F 1 (0:5  v)
=
( p
3 (1  2v) p3 (1 + 2v) if v 2  0; 16p
3 (1  2v) p6 (1  2v) if v 2 16 ; 12 < 0
Based on Proposition 3, if  (v) < 0, then 3 < 0 and withholding information is better. And
a simple calculation veries this
3 =
Z 1
3
0
F (x) (1  F (x)) [1  2F (x)] dx+
Z 1
1
3
F (x) (1  F (x)) [1  2F (x)] dx
=
"
1
3
3
  9
5

1
3
4
+
18
7

1
3
6#
+
"
 4

1
3
3
+
72
5

1
3
4
  288
7

1
3
6#
=   8
35

1
3
3
< 0
3 Conclusion
This paper provides a more general su¢ cient condition than Hummel and McAfee (2015) for
optimal information disclosure when there are 3 bidders. We show that the optimal disclosure
is related to the skewness of the distribution of biddersvaluations. Specically, if the valuation
distribution is skewed to the left (right), then it is optimal for the seller to reveal (withhold). If
the distribution is symmetric, then theres no di¤erence between revealing information or not.
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